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L'efficacité des organismes internationaux 
consacrés aux droits humains 
Institutional Protection of Human Rights 
L.C. GREEN* 
Si l'institutionalisation de la protection des droits humains est 
relativement récente, les auteurs classiques que l'on considère comme les 
«pères » du droit international reconnaissaient l'existence de ces droits. Leurs 
écrits sont significatifs sur ce point. Parlant de ces derniers, l'auteur retrace les 
grandes étapes de la protection institutionnelle des droits humains et fait le 
bilan des réalisations accomplies d'abord par la Société des nations et 
ensuite, sous l'égide des Nations unies. 
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International institutions are comparatively modern in the history of 
international law and doctrinal writings have only become concerned with 
the issue of human rights in a general way since the turn of the century. 
However, it must not be thought that the classical writers were ignorant of 
this problem, even though one may look in vain for such an entry in the index 
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of their writings. While it is true that these "fathers" of international law 
wrote of the law of and between nations, they nevertheless recognized that 
individual human beings possessed certain rights by virtue of natural and 
divine law and that, in certain circumstances, these rights fell to be protected 
by others than their own sovereigns and even against such sovereigns. 
1. Human Rights in the Doctrine of the "Fathers" 
of International Law 
For our purpose it is perhaps sufficient to draw attention to but a few of 
these commentators and to note how they tended to support such 
intervention when carried through in a multilateral fashion. 
Grotius, for example, argued that 
kings and peoples may rightly wage war on account of things done contrary to 
the law of nature, although not against them or their subjects... The fact must be 
recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to those of kings, have 
the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed 
against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not 
affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to 
any persons whatsoever... Truly it is more honourable to avenge the wrongs of 
others rather than one's own, in the degree that in the case of one's own wrongs 
it is more to be feared that through a sense of personal suffering one may exceed 
the proper limit or at least prejudice his mind... Kings, in addition to the 
particular care of their own state, are also burdened with a general responsibility 
for human society ... [and] the ... most wide-reaching cause for undertaking 
wars on behalf of others is the mutual tie of kinship among men, which of itself 
affords sufficient ground for rendering assistance. ' 
Pufendorf, too, showed concern for non-nationals, but he was not prepared 
to go so far as Grotius and advocate military intervention, and while he spoke 
of "the common duties of humanity", springing from 
common sociability ... [and the fact that] Nature has established a kind of 
kinship among men ... [so that] benevolence may be fostered among men, 
he wa rned tha t 
any man who is not our fellow-citizen, or one with whom we live in the natural 
state, is to be regarded, not indeed as an enemy, but still as an inconstant friend 
... so the cautious man who is devoted to his own welfare, believes all men his 
friends with the possibility, however, of presently becoming his enemies... 
[Nevertheless, with all men, even those who live outside of [his own] society, he 
should cultivate universal peace as far as they may allow him to, and he should 
exhibit the service of humanity which he can conveniently... [0]n the basis of the 
De.Iure Belliav Pads, 1625, Lib. III, cap. XX, ss. xl, xliv.cap. XXV, s. vi (Carnegie tr„ 1925, 
504-5, 508, 5X2). 
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law of humanity, any one whatsoever is bound, when not under an equal 
necessity, to the extent of his power to come to aid of a second person in an 
extreme necessity, and necessity creates the power of claiming the aid in very 
much the same manner as we claim the things to which we have a right.2 
Although he did not support the contention that a monarch could go to the 
support of aliens persecuted by their own ruler, he did say that 
if an absolute prince should assume a mind utterly hostile towards his subjects, 
and openly seek their destruction without the pretence of a cause which has at 
least the appearance of justice, his subjects can rightly employ against him also 
the means customarily used against an enemy, for the sake of defending their 
own safety ... [and] we cannot lawfully undertake the defence of another's 
subjects, for any other reason than they themselves can rightfully advance, for 
taking up arms to protect themselves against the barbarous savagery of their 
superior. ' 
Pufendorf also recognized that by the law of humanity all men had 
certain rights in common and 
it is highly inhuman to wish to deny a native of our world the use of those good 
things which the common Father of all men has poured forth, provided that by 
this act the right which we have secured over them for our own personal ends, is 
not diminished... [W]e do not seem to be bound by any law to share with others, 
things which are not absolutely essential to human life, or minister only to its 
pleasures. And if we ourselves are threatened with a lack of such things, we are 
within our right in keeping them for our own good.4 
Not even the early Catholic writers on international law were prepared to 
recognize common rights that imposed a duty upon all to defend all. They 
were concerned rather with the propagation of the faith, even though this 
might appear under the guise of respect for the rights of others, and since 
"'Nature has established a bond of relationship between all men'5, ... it is 
contrary to natural law for one man to dissociate himself from another 
without good cause"6. For this reason it was open to the Pope, at that time the 
nearest to a world authority in existence, to authorize the Spaniards to act 
against the barbarian aborigines of the New World even by resort to war, for 
it is incumbent upon princes to "deliver the poor and needy, rid them out of 
the hand of the wicked"7. The right to wage war 
2. De Officio Humanise! Ovis, 1682, Lib. l,cap. VIII, Lib. II,cap. I (Carnegie tr., 1927,45,90, 
92; Eiementorum Jurisprudenlia Universalis, 1672, Lib. II, Obs. IV, ss. 5-6 (1931, 242-3). 
3. Ibid., Obs. V, ss. 21-2 (292-3) ; De Jure Naturae el Gentium, 1688, Lib. VIII, cap. VI, s. 14 
(1934, 1307). 
4. Ibid., Lib. Ill, cap. Ill, s. II (369). 
5. JUSTINIAN, Digest, I, 3. 
6. ViTOKiA, De Indis Novis Inventis, 1580, Sect. Ill, Proposition II, Proof 5(1917, 153). 
7. Psalm 82. 
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comes from the end and aim and good of the whole world. For there would be 
no condition of happiness for the world, nay, its condition would be one of utter 
misery, if oppression and robbers and plunderers could with impunity commit 
their crimes and oppress the good and innocent, and these latter could not in 
turn retaliate on them." 
However , war m a y be waged on behalf of those no t na t i ona l s of a pr ince 
only on condition that the friend [upon whose behalf it is sought to wage such a 
war] himself would be justified in avenging himself and actually propose to do 
so. Assuming, however, that these conditions exist, my aid to him is an act of co-
operation in a good and just deed ; but if (the injured party) does not entertain 
such a wish, no one else may intervene, since he who has committed the wrong 
has made himself subject not to every one indiscriminately, but only to the 
person who has been wronged... [Moreover,] a Christian prince may not declare 
war save either by reason of some injury inflicted or for the defence of the 
innocent... [which latter] is permissible in a special sense to Christian princes. ' 
T h e ideological c h a r a c t e r of S u a r e z ' s a r g u m e n t s is even c learer in his 
Defensio Fidei. T h u s , 
a Christian king (that is, one subject to the Church by virtue of baptism) may be 
deprived of his power and domination over his vassal; and therefore, the 
ground (of defence for the subjects) is in itself sufficient to endow the Pope with 
power to punish such Christian princes, lawfully depriving them of their 
kingdoms and employing for this purpose the sword of other princes, so that 
sword shall thus be under sword, for the sake of mutual aid in defending and 
protecting the Church. '" 
Pro t e s t an t wri ters , such as T e x t o r , were not p r epa red to concede such 
power to the P o p e " , a l t h o u g h Vat te l went far t o w a r d s recogniz ing a 
c o m m o n ob l iga t ion u p o n all in respect of the m a i n t e n a n c e of the welfare of 
a l l : 
The general law of [natural] society is that each member should assist to others 
in all their needs, as far as can do so without neglecting his duties to himself — a 
law which all men must obey if they are to live comfortably to their nature and to 
the designs of their common Creator... Since the universal society of the human 
race is an institution of nature itself, that is, a necessary result of man's nature, 
all men of whatever condition are bound to advance its interests and to fulfill its 
duties. No convention or special agreement can release them from the 
obligation. When, therefore, men unite in civil society and form a separate State 
or Nation they may, indeed, make particular agreements with others of the same 
State, but their duties towards the rest of the human race remain unchanged ; 
but with this difference, that when men have agreed to act in common, and have 
8. De linhs .Si vc De Jure Belli, 1580, Prop. I, Proof 7(169). 
9 SIIARI /, l)c Triplici I inute Theologien, 1621, De Charitate, Disputatio XIII, s. iv, para, iii, 
s. v, para, iii (Carnegie, Selections From three Works, 1944, 817, 824). 
10. 161.1 Lib. Ill, Cap. XXIII, ss. xxi-xxii (700-2, italics added). 
I I. Synopsis Jute (jenlium, 1680, cap. XVII, s. xiii (Carnegie tr., 1916, 176). 
L.C. GREEN Organismes internationaux et droits humains 551 
given up their rights and submitted their will to the whole body, as far as 
concerns their common good, it devolves thenceforth upon that body, the State, 
and upon its rulers, to fulfill the duties of humanity towards outsiders in all 
matters in which individuals are no longer at liberty to act, and it peculiarly rests 
with the State to fulfill these duties towards other States... This [political] 
society is therefore obliged to live with other societies or States according to the 
laws of the natural society of the human race, just as individual men before the 
establishment of civil society lived according to them. The end of the natural 
society established among men in general is that they should mutually assist one 
another to advance their own perfection and that of their condition; and 
Nations, too, since they may be regarded as so many free persons living together 
in a state of nature, are bound mutually to advance this human society. Hence 
the end of the great society established by nature among all nations is likewise 
that of mutual assistance in order to perfect themselves and their condition. The 
first general law, which is to be found in the very end of the society of Nations, is 
that each Nation should contribute to the happiness and advancement of other 
Nations... [W]hen the occasion arises, every Nation should give its aid to further 
the advancement of other Nations and save them from disaster and ruin, so far 
as it can do so without running too great a risk... [l]f a Nation is suffering from 
famine, all those who have provisions to spare should assist it in its need, 
without, however, exposing themselves to scarcity. To give assistance in such 
dire straits is so instinctive an act of humanity that hardly any civilized Nation is 
to be found which would refuse absolutely to do so... A Nation should not limit 
its good offices to the preservation of other States, but in addition it should 
contribute to their advancement according to its ability and their need of its 
help... Every nation should give its aid when the occasion arises, and according 
to its ability, not only to enable another nation to enjoy those advantages [which 
it enjoys], but to put it in a way to procure them itself... But while a Nation is 
bound to futher, as far as it can, the advancement of others, is has no right to 
force them to accept its offer of help... A Nation has, [however,] only an 
imperfect right to offices of humanity ; it cannot force another Nation to 
perform them... No foreign State may inquire into the manner in which a 
sovereign rules, nor set itself up as judge of his conduct, nor force him to make 
any change in his administration. If he ... treats [his subjects] with severity it is 
for the Nation to take action ; no foreign State is called on to amend his conduct 
and to force him to follow a wiser and juster course... But if a prince, ... by his 
insupportable tyranny, brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign 
power may rightfully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid... 
To give help to a brave people who are defending their liberties against an 
oppressor by force of arms is only the part of justice and generosity... But this 
principle should not be made use of so as to authorize criminal designs against 
the peace of Nations. It is in violation of the Law of Nations to call on subjects to 
revolt when they are actually obeying their sovereign, although complaining of 
his rule... [However,] as for those monsters who, under the name of sovereigns, 
act as a scourge and plague of the human race, they are nothing more than wild 
beasts, of whom every man of courage may justly purge the earth. I2 
12. Le Droit des Gens, 1758, Intro., ss. 10-13, Liv. I I , ch. 1, ss. 3-8, 10, ch. IV, ss. 54-6, 62 
(Carnegie tr., 1916,5-6,, 14-6, 130-1, 134). 
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It is in teres t ing to no te tha t , while Vat te l bases himself to a g rea t ex t en t 
on the teachings of his f e l low-Pro tes tan t Wolff, and speaks of a c o m m o n 
responsibi l i ty to preserve h u m a n i t a r i a n pr inciples , he did no t accept the 
l a t t e r ' s view tha t all na t ions are pa r t of a " s u p r e m e s t a t e " in which all a re 
uni ted . It is in W o l f f s c o m m e n t s t h a t one p e r h a p s first sees t he concep t of a 
poss ible ins t i tu t ional ized p ro tec t ion of h u m a n r ights : 
In this supreme state the nations as a whole have a right to coerce the individual 
nations, if they should be unwilling to perform their obligation, or should show 
themselves negligent in it... [S]ince all nations are understood to have combined 
into a state, of which the individual nations are members, and inasmuch as they 
are understood to have combined in the supreme state, the individual members 
of this are understood to have bound themselves to the whole, because they wish 
to promote the common good, since moreover from the passive obligation of 
one party the right of the other arises ; therefore the right belongs to the nations 
as a whole in the supreme state also of coercing the individual nations, if they are 
unwilling to perform their obligation or show themselves negligent in it. L1 
Since Wolff s ta r ted f rom the p remise of the " s u p r e m e s t a t e" , it is p e r h a p s 
not surpr i s ing to find tha t he asserts t ha t a foreigner has , by the law of 
na t i ons , the same rights as does a cit izen. Hav ing c o n d e m n e d the rule t h a t an 
a l i en ' s p r o p e r t y on d e a t h shou ld be forfeit t o the local t r e a s u r y a n d 
pos tu la ted t h a t aliens have equa l r ights of inher i t ance and success ion M , he 
s ta ted tha t 
[Qoreigners should be allowed to stay in our schools and academies for the 
purpose of study, without giving any consideration to their religion. For 
whatever a learned and cultivated nation can contribute, to make barbarous 
and uncultivated nations learned and cultivated, that it ought to do. 
consequently it ought not to prevent the sciences and liberal arts and virtues 
from flourishing among other nations. Therefore, since in schools and 
academies those things are learned which are necessary and useful for wisdom 
and knowledege, and if entrance to them is open to foreigners also, by that very 
fact it would be brought about that the sciences also and liberal arts and virtues 
would be increased among outside nations, as is self-evident, and since the right 
to stay in our land for the purpose of study is a right of harmless use, not to be 
denied to outside nations, certainly foreigners must be allowed to stay in our 
schools and academies for the purpose of study... [States are also under an 
obligation to allow] foreigners ... to stay with us for the purpose of recovering 
health, without giving any consideration to a difference in religion, ... [S]ince 
every one is bound to do his best to recover his health, consequently he has the 
right to do the acts without which he cannot recover his health, and since this is a 
perfect right, there undoubtedly is reasonable cause for staying in alien territory 
or in lands subject to the ownership of another nation for the purpose of 
recovering health... L1 
13. Jus (icniium MelhoJo Scienlijica Perlraclalum, 1749 the quotation comes from the 1764 
ed.. Prolegomena, s. 13 (Carnegie tr., 1934, 14). 
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Although Wolff regards such rights as those mentioned as belonging to 
all men, and although he considers the "supreme state" to possess a right, and 
perhaps even a duty, to ensure that nations recognize the existence of these 
rights, he does not indicate how this "supreme state" is to ensure observance 
of these duties, other than by conceding the right of unilateral action to 
individual states against the wrongdoer. It was not until the Congress of 
Vienna, 1815 l6, and the establishment of the new Germanic Confederation 
that any attempt was made to create any international guarantee in regard to 
human rights, the right in question being that of religious freedom. This 
principle soon became regarded as a fundamental principle of European 
international law and by the Treaty of Berlin, 1878 l7, obligations to this effect 
were imposed on the successor principalities of the Ottoman Empire, as well 
as upon the whole of that Empire. By now it was clear to the European 
Powers that some means of supervision would be necessary to ensure 
observance of this obligation. The method chosen was by granting the right of 
official protection to the diplomatic and consular agents of those Powers in 
Turkey. While this system might have lacked any form of sanction, it did open 
the way to protest or even humanitarian intervention on the basis of treaty 
law. 
It is inherent in any unilateral action taken by way of what is alleged to be 
humanitarian intervention that this is nothing but the ideological cover for 
political or territorial expansion and many of the nineteenth century writers 
of international law therefore looked upon this "doctrine" with suspicion or 
even aversion : 
It appears that Intervention by one Christian State on behalf of Religion has,... 
in certain circumstances, been practised and cannot be said, in the abstract, to be 
a violation of International Law. But what kind of Intervention? By 
remonstrance, by stipulation, by a condition in a Treaty concluding a war 
waged upon other grounds. It may, perhaps, be justly contended that the 
principle might be pushed further ; and that in the event of persecution of large 
bodies of men, on account of their religious belief, an armed Intervention on 
their behalf might be warrantable by International Law, as an armed 
intervention to prevent the shedding of blood and protracted internal hostilities. 
It is, however, manifestly unsafe to contemplate these extreme cases of 
exception from the sound general rule of non-interference in the domestic 
legislation of Foreign States. The duty of such non-interference is clear; it 
should not be turned into a doubt. Therefore it is that no writer of authority 
14. {hid., ch. Ill, ss. 328, 330 (167, 169). 
15. {bid., ss. 344-5(176-7). 
16. 65C.T.S. 259. 
17. I53C.T.S. 172. 
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upon International Law sanctions such an intervention, except in the case of a 
positive persecution inflicted avowedly upon the ground of religious belief. I8 
Hal l , t o o , was aware of the abuses to which this d o c t r i n e migh t be pu t , b u t t he 
a c k n o w l e d g e d the possibi l i ty t h a t i n t e rven t ions of this k ind m i g h t be 
to le rab le if " au tho r i s ed by the whole b o d y of civilised s t a t e s " : 
International law professes to be concerned only with the relations of states to 
each other. Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, massacres 
and brutality in a civil war19, or religious persecution20 are acts which have 
nothing to do directly or indirectly with such relations. On what ground then 
can international law take cognizance of them at all? It may be supposed to 
declare that acts of the kind mentioned are so inconsistent with the character of 
a moral being as to constitute a moral scandal, which the body of states, or one 
or more states as representative of it, are competent to suppress. The 
supposition strains the fiction that states which are under international law 
form a kind of society to an extreme point, and some of the special grounds, 
upon which intervention effected under its sanction is based, are not easily 
distinguishable in principle from others which modern opinion has branded as 
unwarrantable... [Intervention for the purpose of checking gross tyranny or of 
helping the efforts of a people to free itself is very commonly regarded without 
disfavour. Again, religious oppression, short of cruelty which would rank as 
tyranny, has ceased to be recognized as an independent ground of intervention, 
but is still used between Europe and the East as an accessory motive, which 
seems to be thought by many persons sufficiently praiseworthy to excuse the 
commission of acts in other respects grossly immoral... [Sjentiment has been 
allowed to influence the more deliberately formed opinions of jurists ... [who] 
have imparted an aspect of legality to a species of intervention, which makes a 
deep inroad into one of the cardinal doctrines of international law ; of which the 
principle is not even intended to be equally applied to the cases covered by it; 
and which by the readiness with which it lends itself to the uses of selfish 
ambition becomes as dangerous in practice as it is plausible in appearance. It is 
unfortunate that publicists have not laid down broadly and unanimously that 
no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a 
breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the whole body of 
civilised states has concurred in accepting it. Intervention, whether armed or 
diplomatic, undertaken either for the reason or upon the pretexts of cruelty, or 
oppression, or the horrors of a civil war, whatever the reason put forward, 
supported in reality by the justification which such facts offer to the public 
mind, would have had to justify themselves, when not authorised by the whole 
body of civilised states accustomed to act together for common purposes, as 
measures which, confessedly illegal in themselves, could only be expressed in 
18. PHIMIMOKI, International Law, 1879, vol. I, (S22-3 (iliilics in original); see, also, 
MACKINIOSH, History of England, 1853, 127. 
19. See, now, Protocol II relative to Humanitarian Law in Non-International A rmed Conflicts, 
(1977) 16 Im'I Legal Materials 1443. 
20. See, now, Declaration on Elimination of All Fronts of Intolerance and Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, 1981. (Jen. Ass., Res. 36/55 (21 ibid., 205). 
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race and extreme cases in consideration of the unquestionably extraordinary 
character of the facts causing them, and of the evident purity and motives of the 
intervening state.2I 
2. The League of Nations and the Institutional Protection 
of Human Rights 
The reaction of the majority of states towards the abuses committed by 
the Nazi government of Germany against its own people shows how unwilling 
states were, either individually or as a collective body, to act in the name of 
humanity. In fact, in 1938, Professor H.A. Smith of the University of London 
complained that 
in practice we no longer insist that States shall conform to any common 
standards of justice, religious toleration and internal government. Whatever 
atrocities may be committed in foreign countries, we now say they are no 
concern of ours. Conduct which in the nineteenth century would have placed a 
government outside the pale of civilised society is now deemed to be no obstacle 
to diplomatic friendship. This means, in fact, that we have abandoned the old 
distinction between civilised and uncivilised states. n 
Smith's statement leads one to enquire whether the creation of the 
League of Nations had any effect upon the institutional protection of human 
rights. It is perhaps opportune, therefore, to examine the role of the League in 
this matter. Since it is primarily concerned with the maintenance of peace, 
understood as the preservation of the status quo established by the Treaty of 
Versailles, of which the Covenant formed the opening chapter, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the Covenant makes no express reference to the issue of 
human rights. However, it should not be ignored that the Covenant was 
largely based on the principles promulgated in Wilson's Fourteen Points23 
which clearly advocated recognition of self-determination24, a matter also 
advocated by Lloyd George25. In pursuit of these proposals, the Covenant 
authorised the admission of "any fully self-governing State, Dominion or 
Colony"26. It would appear that the term "self-governing" was intended to 
indicate "democratic", in the sense of "responsible to the people"27. In 
21. Treatise on International Law, 1880, Higgins ed. 1924, 342-4 (italics added). 
22. The Listenet, 26 Jan. 1938, 183. 
23. 5 WHITKMAN, Digest of International Law, A2-~>>. 
24. E.g.. Points III. VI. X. XII. XIII. 
25. TFMPERLEY, A History of the Peace Conference, 1920/24, vol. 2, 277-8). 
26. Art. 1(2). 
27. HUNTER MILLER, The Drafting of the Covenant, 1928, vol. I, 164-7,239-40, vol. 2,262,303, 
427-S, 473. 
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practice, it soon became clear that the term indicated "independence" 
regardless of the form of government, or whether the inhabitants of the 
country concerned enjoyed any human rights or were under an autocracy or 
dictatorship. The difficulty inherent in defining self-government exists today 
in relation to self-determination. 
The concern with self-government was in some ways the counterpart to 
the rejection of colonialism which found expression not in independence but 
in the establishment of the mandates system. In contrast with previous wars 
the Allied and Associate Powers did not annex the colonial possessions of 
their former enemies, but introduced instead a mandatory system to be 
applied 
to those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them 
and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, [based on] the principle that the 
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation 
and securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this 
Covenant. The best method of giving effect to this principle is that the tutelage 
of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their 
resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake 
this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should 
be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.2li 
For those territories regarded as most politically advanced, the task of the 
Mandatory was to assist them to achieve independence, while the choice of 
Mandatory was to be determined in the light of the wishes of the community 
concerned 29 — although this latter principle was rather honoured in the 
breach than the observance. As to peoples not in this "advanced" political 
condition, the Mandatory was to observe 
conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject 
only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses 
such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic .... 
although from the economic point of view it was not so much the rights and 
interests of the inhabitants which were to be respected as undue benefit to the 
Mandatory was to be prevented, for the latter was obliged "to secure equal 
opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the 
League"-1". 
Supervision of the system on behalf of the League was placed under a 
Permanent Mandates Commission with the possibility that disputes as to the 
2K. Art. 22, paras., 1, 2. 
29. Ibid., para. 4. 
3Ü. Ibid., paras. 5, 6. 
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o p e r a t i o n of any M a n d a t e ag reemen t cou ld be referred t o the P e r m a n e n t 
C o u r t of In te rna t iona l Jus t ice . T h e C o m m i s s i o n only enjoyed a supp lemen ta ry 
cr i t ical or adv i so ry func t ion , and its c o m m e n t s u p o n repor t s submi t t ed to it 
t ended to be at least a year late : 
the supervision exercised by it was essentially supplementary; since during the 
actual course of the year supervision had already been exercised by the national 
government and parliament of the mandatory power as in the case of any 
normal dependency. Not even the outbreak of a world war could deflect the 
Commission from its rule that it was precluded from enquiring into the events of 
the current year unless the accredited representatives chose to supply data in 
advance of the annual report. The Commission's report to the League on its last 
session in December 1939,... states: "The Commission has deliberately 
refrained from anticipating the events of 1939 by examining the situation 
created by the present war in connection with territories placed under the 
mandate of the belligerent Powers. It will do so in the light of the information 
with which these mandatory Powers supply it when they give an account of their 
stewardship during 1939." Nothing could demonstrate better than this how far 
back from events the Commission stood, how much it was a spectator on the 
sidelines, and how little its function could be that of a government, or a court 
actively intervening to help its wards in the fate that had befallen them. For the 
fact that war, with all its far-reaching legal, political, and economic 
consequences, had enveloped the mandated territories, was without question 
the most decisive event in their history. In defining its own functions in the past 
the Commission had repeatedly emphasised its desire to act "as collaborators 
who are resolved to devote their experience and their energies to a joint 
endeavor ... [Lt would strive] to assist the mandatory Governments in carrying 
out the important and difficult tasks which they are accomplishing on behalf of 
the League of Nations. Yet in the supreme crisis of general war it felt unable to 
do more than ask the accredited representatives a legal question : whether in 
their opinion the state of belligerency in which they were themselves involved 
extended to the territories under mandate. Professor Rappard, expressing a 
view which seemed to be shared by several members of the Commission, 
doubted whether this should or could be the case, since "the belligerent 
Powers ... administered them in the name of the League of Nations which was 
not at war". -" 
T h e ar t i f ic ia l i ty of th i s r e a s o n i n g m a y be seen in the fact t h a t b o t h 
m a n d a t o r i e s and Axis P o w e r s regarded the m a n d a t e d ter r i tor ies as zones of 
war . A sen ior m e m b e r of the League Secre ta r i a t has said of the C o m m i s s i o n . 
In practice its main role tended to be of an Old Testament character. It was the 
keeper of the Ten Commandments of Article 22 of the Covenant. It looked on 
itself as charged with bringing to light breaches and urging their rectification. It 
was zealous, though very diplomatic, in the exercise of its legal powers. But it 
was reluctant to step outside these powers and to offer positive suggestions to 
the mandatory powers as to how the territories should be administered and 
developed. In short, its attention was fixed mainly on judging past events and 
31. HALL, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, 1948,49-50. 
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particular situations, rather than upon prescribing future action... [F]ew, if any, 
of many important positive developments that took place in Africa in the way of 
increasing self-government, health measures, sanitation, education, the 
application of science to the problems of the African environment, labour 
legislation, and many others ... were due to any direct initiative on the part of 
the Mandates Commission.12 
The practical effect of the role of the Permanent Court in so far as the status of 
the mandated territory or the rights of its inhabitants and the obligations of 
the mandatory towards them was even less significant33. As we will see later, 
the role of the International Court of Justice has been somewhat more 
substantial. 
Because of the fears aroused by the example of the Bolshevik Revolution 
in Russia, it was generally accepted that provision had to be made in the 
Covenant for the recognition of social justice34. In accordance with Article 23 
the Members 
will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for 
men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to 
which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose 
will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations; 
undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under 
their control; will entrust the League with the general supervision over the 
execution of agreements with regard to the trade in women and children, and 
the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; ... 
will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the 
prevention and control of disease. 
To this end, a series of treaties dealing with the traffic in women and children, 
the slave trade, the traffic in drugs and the control of epidemics was entered 
into under the auspices of the League. More important, perhaps, is Part Xlll 
of the Treaty of Versailles establishing the International Labour 
Organization to give effect to the commitment to the improvement of labour 
conditions mentioned in Article 23. Examination of the Preamble to the 
relevant part of the Treaty explaining the purpose underlying the 
Organization reflects the fear that disastrous working and economic 
conditions could easily result in revolution, and this fear can still be read into 
the Preamble of the Organization's Constitution as amended -15 : 
32. Ibid., 51-2. 
33. The dispute between Greece and the United Kingdom considered by the Court in relation to 
the Muvrommalis Concessions (1924/1925) Ser. A., Nos. 2, 5 (I Hudson, World Court 
Reports, 297, 355) dealt with the compatibility of British obligations under a bilateral 
agreement with those under the Mandate for Palestine. 
34. Sec. e.g., KFFTON, Making International Law Work, 1946, 108. 
35. 2 Pi-ASI.EE, International Governmental Organizations, 1961, 1233. 
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Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon 
social justice; And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, 
hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great 
that the peace and harmony of the world are threatened ; and an improvement 
of these conditions is urgently required : as, for example, by the regulation of the 
hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and 
week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the 
provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against 
sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of 
children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, 
protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than 
their own, recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal 
value, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organization of 
vocational and technical education and other measures; 
Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is 
an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in 
their own countries... 
Whi le the O r g a n i z a t i o n is c o m m i t t e d to the b e t t e r m e n t of l a b o u r cond i t i ons , 
t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of P h i l a d e l p h i a of 1944, w h i c h is a n n e x e d t o t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , indica tes the close re la t ion be tween l a b o u r and h u m a n r ights : 
The [International Labour] Conference recognizes the solemn obligation of the 
I.L.O. to further among the nations of the world programs which will achieve: 
(a) full employment and the raising of standards of living; 
(b) the employment of workers in occupations in which they can have the 
satisfation of giving the fullest measure of their skill and attainments and 
make their greatest contribution to the common well-being; 
(c) the provision, as a means to the attainment of this end and under adequate 
guarantees for all concerned, of facilities for training and the transfer of 
labour, including migration for employment and settlement ; 
(d) policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of 
work calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and a 
minimum living wage to all employed and in need of such protection; 
(e) the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the co-
operation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of 
productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and employers in 
the preparation and application of social and economic measures ; 
(f) the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in 
need of such protection and comprehensive medical care ; 
(g) adequate protection for the life and health of workers in all occupations ; 
(h) provision for child welfare are and maternity protection ; 
(i) the provision of adequate nutrition, housing and facilities for recreation 
and culture ; 
(j) the assurance of equality of educational and vocational opportunity. 
To achieve the ends desired the constitution of the International Labour 
Organization differed from the traditional institutional format. Instead of 
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comprising only representatives of the member states, it was organized on a 
tripartite basis giving representation to employers and workers alike36. To 
achieve its objectives the Organization has sponsored more than 100 
conventions known generically as the International Labour Code. These 
Conventions do not, however, fall within the usual definition ofthat term, for 
they constitute pieces of draft municipal legislation which are submitted to 
national legislatures for "ratification" as part of the national legal system. The 
parties to the conventions must submit annual reports which are examined by 
committees of experts who may raise questions with the governments 
concerned, while any member state may complain to the International 
Labour Office about another state's observance of a convention to which it is 
a party, and this complaint may be referred to a commission of inquiry and 
ultimately to the World Court. Although the present Court has not been 
called upon to interpret the validity or extent of any labour convention, the 
Permanent Court did rule upon such matters as the proper selection of 
workers' representatives17, competence respecting agricultural labour and 
production38, competence to regulate the personal work of employers39, and 
the employment of women during the night40. At the present time, the l.L.O. 
has been called upon to consider such matters as the right of association 
particularly when claimed by civil servants and the right of a member state, or 
a constituent part thereof, to forbid strikes by such workers41. In this 
connection it should be noted that no state likes to be condemned as in breach 
of its international obligations and it will endeavour, therefore, to comply 
with recommendations made to it by a commission of enquiry. Withdrawal or 
expulsion from the Organization does not serve to protect the rights of those 
intended in any way, for it is self-destructive enabling the country concerned 
to act in any way it pleases, without being subject to control, supervision or 
criticism. 
Two other fields in which the League played a role in so far as the 
institutional protection of human rights was concerned related to the 
36. See, however, GRKKN, "The International Labour Organisation Under Pressure", (1957) 10 
Current Legal Problems 57. 
37. Nominalion of the Netherlands Workers' Delegate to the International Labour Conference 
(1922) Ser. B/1 (I Hudson, World Court Reports, 115). 
38. Competence of the I. L. 0. with regard to Agricultural Labour and Production ( 1922) Ser. B/ 
2,3 {ibid., 124, 138). 
39. Competence oj the l.L.O. to Regulate. Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer 
(1926) Ser. B/13 (Ibid., 746). 
40. Interpretation of the 1919 Convention concerning Employment of Women during the Night 
(1932) Ser. AB, 50 (3 ibid., 100). 
41. See, e.g.. Re Alberta Union of Public Employees and the Crown in Right of Alberta (1980) 
120 D.L.R.(3rd)590. 
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protection of minorities and of refugees. As a result of the break-up of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, the restoration of Poland and the redrawing of 
boundaries after 1919, numerous ethnic minorities found themselves in alien 
territory and treaties were drawn up to provide for their protection, generally 
speaking guaranteeing them equal treatment and protection against adverse 
discrimination. The draftsmen of the treaties sought to ensure that the 
guarantees would be effective by placing them under the guarantee of the 
League, with ultimate recourse to the Permanent Court for interpretation. To 
this end the League Council accepted that the "guarantee" 
means, above all, that the provisions for the protection of minorities are 
inviolable, that is to say, they cannot be modified in the sense of violating in any 
way rights actually recognized, and without the approval of the majority of the 
Council of the League of Nations. Secondly, this stipulation means that the 
League must ascertain that the provisions for the protection of minorities are 
always observed. 
The Council must take action in the event of any infraction, or danger of 
infraction, on any of the obligations with regard to the minorities in question. 
The Treaties in this respect are quite clear. They indicate the procedure that 
should be followed. 
The right of calling attention to any infraction or danger of infraction is reserved 
to the Members of the Council. This, in its way, is a right and duty of the Powers 
represented on the Council. By this right, they are in fact asked to take a special 
interest in the protection of minorities. 
Evidently this right does not in any way exclude the right of minorities 
themselves, or even of States not represented on the Council, to call the 
attentioon of the League of Nations to any infraction or danger of infraction. 
But this act must retain the nature of a petition, or a report pure and simple ; it 
cannot have the legal effect of putting the matter before the Council and calling 
upon it to intervene. 
Consequently, when a petition with regard to the question of minorities is 
addressed to the League of Nations, the Secretary-General should communicate 
it, without comment, to the Members of the Council for information. This 
communication does not yet constitute a judicial act of the League or of its 
organs. The competence of the Council to deal with the question arises only 
when one of its Members draws its attention to the infraction or danger of 
infraction which is the subject of the petition or report.42 
Since the procedure indicated above involved an accusation by one 
member against another, the Council appointed a small committee to which 
petitions should normally be presented in the first instance. From an early 
date, however, some of the countries subjected to the minorities regime 
protested at the manner in which all League members were being informed of 
42. A/CAR Ml-, The League of Nations and national Minorities, 1944, 178. 
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alleged breaches and, gradually for political reasons, especially after the rise 
of National Socialism in Germany. France, for example, was increasingly 
prepared to support such allies as Czechoslovakia or Poland in their defiance 
of minority obligations, and this problem became more serious as Germany 
began protesting at the treatment of its own minorities in the successor states. 
For political reasons, therefore, it soon became clear that the League's role in 
regard to the protection of minorities could hardly be described as a great 
success 4 \ However, there were occasions on which the Permanent Court had 
been called upon to interpret both the significance of particular minorities 
treaties and even what became known as the minorities regime44, derived 
from the fact that all the minorities treaties tended to include the same 
provisions and were directed to the same end. Perhaps the most important 
contribution made by the Court is to be found in its definition of the term 
"equality". At the same time the Court's comments on the purpose of a 
minorities regime may well serve as guidance for any institutional protection 
of human rights. The purpose was to 
secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which 
differs from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of living 
peacefully alongside that population and cooperating amicably with it, while at 
the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the 
majority, and satisfying the ensuring special needs. In order to attain this object, 
two things were regarded as particularly necessary... The first is to ensure that 
nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic [or other] minorities shall be 
placed in every respect, on a footing of perfect equality with the other nationals 
of the State. The second is to ensure for the minority elements suitable means for 
the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national 
characteristics. These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, for there 
would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were 
deprived of its own institutions, and were consequently compelled to renounce 
that which constitutes the very essence of its being as a minority45... The main 
objective of the [regime] is to assure respect for rights of the minorities and to 
prevent discrimination against them by any act whatsoever of the State. It does 
not matter whether the rights the infraction of which is alleged are derived from 
legislative, judicial or administrative act...46 [T]he members of minorities who 
are not citizens of the state enjoy protection — guaranteed by the League of 
Nations - - of life, liberty and the free exercise of their religion, while minorities 
in the narrow sense, that is, minorities the members of which are citizens of the 
State, enjoy — under the same guarantee — amongst other rights, equality of 
rights in civil and political matters, and in matters relating to primary 
instruction...4 ' 
4.1. See, e.g., ROBINSON, Were The Minorities Treaties A Failure?, 1943. 
44. Minority Schools in Albania ( 1935) Ser. AB, 64 (3 Hudson, World Court Reports, 496). 
45. Ibid., 17(496). 
46. German Selliers in Poland (1923) Ser. B 6 (I Ibid., 219). 
47. Treatment oj Polish Nationals in Danzig (1932) Ser. AB/44, 39-40 (2 Ibid., 8I4-5). 
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It may well be that a particular minority possesses a language different 
from that of the majority among whom it lives, and may also possess a 
different history and worship a different religion. This may mean that, if they 
are to enjoy their heritage, complete identity of treatment as between the 
members of the minority and of the majority may be impossible, as would 
have been the case if the Court had upheld the Albanian government's desire 
to have all children, including those of the Greek minority, educated in the 
same state schools. The purpose of minority protection is to guarantee 
to racial minorities the.same treatment and security "in law and fact "as to other 
nationals. The fact that no racial discrimination appears in the text of the law ... 
makes no substantial difference... There must he equality in fact as well as 
ostensible equality in the sense of discrimination in the words of the law4*... It is 
perhaps not easy to define the distinction between the notions of equality... 
Equality in law precludes any discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in 
fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to obtain a result 
which establishes an equilibrium between different situations. It is easy to 
imagine cases in which equality of treatment of the majority and of the minority, 
whose situation and requirements are different, would result in inequality in 
fact... The equality between members of the majority and of the minority must 
be an effective, genuine equality...Far from creating a privilege in favour of 
the minority, ... [a] stipulation [in favour of, for example, minority schools] 
ensures that the majority shall not be given a privileged situation as compared 
with the minority... The expression "equal right" is that the right thus conferred 
on the members of the minority cannot in any case be inferior to the 
corresponding right of other ... nationals. In other words, the members of the 
minority must always enjoy the right stipulated .... and, in addition, any more 
extensive rights which the State may accord to other nationals. The right 
provided ... is in fact the minimum necessary to guarantee effective and genuine 
equality as between the majority and the minority; but if the members of the 
majority should be granted a right more extensive than the right which is 
provided, the principle of equality of treatment would come into play and would 
require that the more extensive right should be granted to the members of the 
minority.-1'' 
This principle of "preferential" treatment may be seen in the practice 
adopted by some states in what has become known as "affirmative action", or 
in the rejection by the United States of the "separate but equal" doctrine 
established by Plessy v. Ferguson5" which has been replaced by that of 
"separate and therefore unequal" as expounded in Brown v. Board of 
Education5I. On the international level, too, we find acknowledgement of the 
fact that "formal inequality" may be the only means of ensuring "real 
48. Supra, note 46 above, 24 (218, italics added). 
49. Supra, note 45, 19-20 (498-500, italics added). 
50. 169 U.S. 537(1896). 
51. 347 U.S. 483(1954). 
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equality". Thus, in the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination52 adopted under the auspices of the 
United Nations, and to which over 120 states are parties, Article 1(4) 
provides : 
Special measures taken lor the sole purpose oj securing adequate advancement 
oj certain racial or ethnic groups oj individuals requiring such protection as may 
be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not he deemed racial 
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a 
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial 
groups and that they shall not he continued after the objectives for which they 
were taken have been achieved. 
As to the problem of refugees, while the "fathers" of international law 
had recognized that individual refugees might need asylum from their home 
countries51 for various reasons, it was not until the Russian Revolution that 
the issue became sufficiently pressing for it to require attention on an 
international scale, for there were now some two million poverty-stricken 
persons needing some sort of help. In 1921 the League established a Refugee 
Organization with Nansen as its High Commissioner. In 1922 the "Nansen 
passport" — an identity card for refugees — was introduced which more than 
fifty governments accepted as an authority for travel, and after Ataturk's 
assumption of power in Turkey the same document became available to 
Armenian refugees. As time passed, the rights of refugees under the 
protection of the League's High Commissioner were gradually widened and 
in 1933 the first Convention on the International Status of Refugees was 
adopted 54. The parties undertook to issue one-year Nansen passports and 
during their validity holders were to be free to leave and return. They also 
undertook not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontier of the country from 
which they were fleeing, while regulations were introduced concerning 
personal status, religious rights, access to courts, welfare and educational 
eligibility, and employment restrictions were relaxed. While provision was 
made for denunciation, there was nothing by way of enforcement or 
supervision. With the rise of Nazism in Germany the problem of refugees 
became more intense, but to all intents and purposes the sole function of the 
League was to pass resolutions, indulge in sympathetic statements and 
organize conferences. In fact, the Refugee Office 
was always regarded as temporary, and the Assembly did not fail to remind it 
each year that it had only a few more years to live. It was an unpopular 
52. 660 UNIS 195. 
53. See. e.g., GRF.FN "Refugees and Refugee Status — Causes and Treatment in Historico-Legal 
Pespeclive", (1983) 13 Thesaurus Acroasium (Thessaloniki) 529. 
54. 159 LNTS 199. 
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institution. The refugees themselves were naturally conscious above all of its 
limitations. Britain, the Dominions, and overseas countries in general were 
apprehensive of being asked to contribute to the solution of a problem for which 
they admitted no responsibility. Most European countries blamed the 
Organization for giving them less help than they felt entitled to expect. Italy, 
alter Mussolini took power, was consistently hostile, fearing lest protection 
might be extended to those who had fled from Fascist persecution; Germany 
after 1933 and Russia after her entry into the League tried to put an end to it for 
similar reasons. The United Stales, then taking special measures to restrict 
immigration, refused to participate in its work. Its only warm support came 
horn Fiance, the one country which offered welcome and fair treatment to 
immigrants, and from the Scandinavian countries, for Nansen's sake. In these 
circumstances, it was not surprising that no efficient and well-defined 
organization was ever built up. The High Commissioner had a small staff in 
Geneva, first attached to the League Secretariat, then transferred to the 
International Labour Office, and later brought back to the Secretariat. He 
appointed representatives in about fifteen European capitals: these men were 
usually government officials and only in a secondary degree agents of the 
League. He convoked a number of conferences in the hope of securing a 
common policy on the subject : but, with the important exception of the general 
introduction of the Nansen passport, the results were small. For the most part, 
his action was carried on by direct negotiation with individual governments. 
Each year he demanded and received the approbation of the Assembly, and the 
funds to keep his staff in being: he never received from the League any greater 
support than t h i s " 
The pressure of refugees from Germany led a number of European 
powers to adopt a further Convention in 193856 dealing with the status of 
German refugees, and extended in 1939 to Austrians57. Refugees were 
defined as those who possessed or had possessed German or Austrian 
nationality and were able to prove that they did not possess the protection of 
those governments, and it also applied to stateless persons. However, persons 
who had left for personal convenience were not covered, so that many 
political refugees remained unprotected. In some ways, this Convention was a 
step backwards, for it enabled the country of "refuge" to return a refugee to 
German territory, provided he had been warned and refused "without just 
cause" to make the necessary arrangements to proceed elsewhere or to take 
advantage of arrangements made for him to this end. This, for example, 
enabled the United Kingdom to refuse German refugees entry into Palestine 
and to force them to return to German-occupied territory or to be interned in 
camps in Africa or elsewhere, without any formal breach of the Convention. 
55. I WALTERS, A History of the League of Nations, 1952, 189. 
56. 192 LNTS59. 
57. 198 LNTS 141. 
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3. The United Nations and the Institutional Protection 
of Human Rights 
After the Second World War the problem of refugees was more serious 
than ever, before and under the auspices of the United Nations an 
International Refugee Office was established in 19465K and a New 
Convention on the Status of Refugees was adopted in 1951, with its scope 
extended by Protocolin 196759. Moreover, efforts were also made to provide 
some rights and protection for stateless persons and to reduce statelessness as 
such''", although the number of parties to these conventions is relatively 
infinitesimal. To a great extent these agreements, which are of general 
application, grant to the persons affected rights that are almost the equivalent 
of those enjoyed by local nationals, and this is particularly so for those parties 
to the Convention which are also parties to the International Covenants of 
Human Rights''1. From the point of view of the refugee, perhaps the most 
significant provision is that providing for non-refoulement, forbidding return 
to a country where the refugee's life or freedom would be endangered because 
of race, religion, nationality, etc. However, although the United Nations 
High Commissioner is available to oversee the operation of the Convention, 
its application is to a great extent controlled by national law and there is no 
provision for any sanction in case of breach, other than the possibility that 
one party might object to the breach of the Convention by another party. It 
should be remembered, however, that the International Court of Justice has 
ruled that there is no scope for an actio papillaris, and while a party might 
have the locus standi to bring an action, it has no standing to secure a remedy 
unless it is itself the victim of some damage as a result of the breach62. 
The record of the United Nations in regard to the protection of refugees 
in practice has been no better than that of the League of Nations. Perhaps it is 
sufficient to quote from the 1982 Annual Report of the High Commissioner61. 
He drew attention in the Introduction to the fact that the problem of refugees 
in Africa, Central America, Asia and Latin America was as serious as ever. 
He pointed out that states consistently declare their support for the principle 
of non-refoulement, which is described as a "fundamental norm"64: 
58. 18 UNTS 13. 
59. 189 UNTS 137; 606 UNTS 267. 
60. 360 UNTS I 17; 989 UNTS. 175. 
61. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3; Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 
171. 
62. South West Africa Cases, [1962] I . C I . 319 ; [1966] I.C.J. 6. 
63. 14 May 1982, Doc. E/1982/29. 
64. See, also, e.g., decision of Supreme Court, Israel, Kurtz ami Lelushinskyv. Kirschen, (1967) 
47 I.L.R. 212. 
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It is therefore disappointing to record that during the reporting period asylum-
seekers were forcibly returned to countries where they were in danger of 
persecution or even in risk of their lives. A number of measures of 
refoulement ... involved asylum-seekers who were fleeing contlict or civil 
disorder in their home countries. In one region, agreement between the military 
forces of neighbouring countries of asylum and origin resulted in repeated 
measures of refoulement involving individuals and small groups of asylum-
seekers. In the same region, some 2000 asylum-seekers were returned to their 
slrife-lorn country while efforts were made to ascertain the validity of their 
claims for asylum... Refugees were forcibly returned because they did not have 
documents attesting to the fact that their asylum request was under 
consideration or, if asylum had already been granted, to their legal status as 
refugees... 
T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r w a s h ighly cr i t ica l of t he m a n n e r in wh ich 
i m m i g r a t i o n and o the r officials e x a m i n e d c la ims for a sy lum o r refugee s t a tus , 
a n d 
there are indications that the practice of detaining asylum-seekers, sometimes 
for indeterminate periods of time, is on the increase. This development is a 
matter of grave concern, as is the practice adopted by several States ... to detain 
refugees in order to deter others from seeking asylum in their territory. It is 
hoped that States will refrain from resorting to such measures of deterrent and 
that in future refugees will only be detained in clearly exceptional 
circumstances... 
It is c lear t h a t the Uni ted N a t i o n s , despi te its s p o n s o r s h i p of the re levant 
C o n v e n t i o n s , is not really conce rned with the welfare or care of refugees a n d , 
in fact, it m a k e s no effort to c o n d e m n any s ta te for its c o n d u c t in this ma t t e r . 
It wou ld also a p p e a r tha t s ta tes a re no t over - impressed by the H igh 
C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s as to the m a n n e r in which regu la t ions 
shou ld be appl ied : 
Asylum requests should not be excluded from consideration under asylum 
procedures because of mere non-compliance with formal requirements... 
States should pay particular attention to the need for avoiding situations in 
which refugees lose their right to reside in or return to the country of asylum 
without having acquired the possibility of taking up residence in another 
country. 
... States, if constrained in exceptional cases to adopt exceptional measures 
against a refugee, should give due consideration lo whether or not the refugee 
has the possibility of being admitted to a country other than his country of 
origin. 
In applying internal legislative or administrative provisions concerning the loss 
of the right of residence of a refugee, or also generally in the case of departure or 
prolonged absence, States should have particular regard to the need for 
avoiding situations in which refugees find themselves without a country in 
which they can lawfully reside. 
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States ... should continue to extend the validity of, or to renew refugee travel 
documents until the refugee has taken up residence in the territory of another ... 
State. 
Where a refugee has already been granted asylum in one State requests asylum 
in another State on the grounds that he has compelling reasons for leaving his 
present asylum country, e.g., danger to physical security or freedom, the 
authorities of the second State should give favourable consideration to his 
asylum request. 
It is all very well for the High Commissioner to make these recommendations, 
but until his Office has a power of sanction or the United Nations is prepared 
to take up issues with a view to positive recommendations — although it 
should be borne in mind that recommendations of the General Assembly lack 
any obligatory force — there is no true institutional recognition or protection 
of the human rights of refugees. 
From the point of view of the public and most commentators it would 
appear that institutional recognition of human rights relates to the activities 
of the United Nations commencing with the Universal Declaration of 194865, 
intended to spell out the content of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms which the Members of the United Nations had undertaken to 
promote and encourage respect. However, the Declaration is in itself 
somewhat self-contradictory in that it seeks to protect all mankind against 
any discrimination of any kind based upon "race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status", and guarantees protection against torture, arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile, and at the same time provides that "everyone has the right 
to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution" — which, 
of course, could not possibly arise if the guaranteed rights prescribed in the 
Declaration were respected. Moreover, although rights, including that of 
asylum are granted, there is no obligation imposed upon any state to grant the 
rights so claimed, nor is there any provision for sanction in so far as any state 
fails to grant such rights. The fact that the General Assembly has chosen on 
occasion to condemn such practices as the denial of married couples' right to 
live in a country of their choice or such practices as apartheid M does not mean 
that the Declaration is declaratory of general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations and thus part of the jus cogens of international law, for 
resolutions to this effect are purely political67, while the practice of states 
65. Ci.A. Res. 2 I7( I I I )A. 
66. See. e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Aparthied, 1015, UNTSS 244, which by the end of 1986 has only some 84 parties. 
67. See, e.g.. Gm IN, "Human Rights and the General Principles of Law", (1955) 8 Current 
Lentil Problems 162. 
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condemned by such bodies as Amnesty International or the International 
Commission of Jurists makes it clear that states do not regard themselves as 
bound to respect the provisions of the Declaration. This view of the 
Declaration as lacking any formal legal authority is supported by Judge 
Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 Southwest Africa decision M, and 
even Judge Ammoun, the only member of the bench in the Namibia opinion 
mentioning the Declaration is only prepared to describe it as perhaps 
amounting to custom or a general principle accepted as law, but even he states 
that "one right which must certainly be considered a pre-existing binding 
customary norm which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights codified 
is the right to equality, which by common consent has ever since the remotest 
times been deemed inherent in human nature"'*' — hardly a basis for 
regarding the Declaration as having had any real legal significance, other 
than perhaps to spell the right out in greater detail ! The nearest one gets to a 
formal declaration of legal significance for the Declaration is a casual 
reference in the Court's judgment concerning United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehranl1" that "wrongfully to deprive human beings of 
their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of 
hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights", and one might add with the 
traditional views concerning the minimum standards relating to the 
treatment of aliens, which long antedate either instrument. 
In an attempt to give substance to the Universal Declaration, the United 
Nations drew up the two International Covenants of Human Rights7I which, 
like any other treaty, are creative of international law imposing obligations 
upon their parties. Neither of these Covenants possesses any sanction in 
respect of breaches, although both contain provisions which enable criticism 
of the conduct or parties to be levied, and it must be remembered that no state 
will happily submit to being condemned as a lawbreaker, so that there is the 
inherent voeu that criticism will lead to reform. In the case of the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the procedure is by way of parties 
reporting on "the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights 
recognized herein", and the Economic and Social Council "may submit to the 
Commission on Human Rights for study and general recommendation or as 
appropriate for information the reports" thus submitted, and the Council is 
authorized to submit "the General Assembly reports with recommendations 
68. South West Africa (Judgement), [1966] l.C.J. 4, 293. 
69. Namibia Opinion, [1977] l.C.J. 16, 76 (italics added). 
70. [1980] I.C.J., 3, 42. 
71. Supra, note 61 above. 
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of a general nature and a summary of the information received ... on the 
measures taken and the progress made in achieving general observance of the 
rights recognized." The position with regard to the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights is somewhat more realistic. An elected Human Rights 
Committee to which reports are to be submitted has been established and the 
Committee "shall transmit its reports, and such comments as it may consider 
appropriate to the States Parties" to the Covenant. It may also submit these 
reports and the comments made thereon to the Economic and Social Council. 
Moreover, parties may, if they choose, agree to grant the Committee 
authority "to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State 
Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations" under 
the Covenant, which may then seek a satisfactory solution, if necessary by 
way of a Conciliation Commission. If, however, this proves impossible, there 
is no effective way in which a lawbreaker can be brought into conformity with 
its obligations. Finally, for those parties signing an Optional Protocol the 
Committee is given competence "to receive and consider communications 
from individuals subject to [the] jurisdiction [of the party concerned] who 
claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set 
forth in the Covenant." Once again, however, there is no ultimate effective 
sanction. Moreover, as already pointed out72, the World Court has taken the 
line that no remedy will lie to a state pleading a breach of treaty in the absence 
of proof of injury from that breach. 
What has been said of the lack of effective sanctions in the two 
International Covenants is equally true of the various treaties of a potentially 
universal character that have been prepared under the auspices of the United 
Nations with reference to specific human rights or the human rights of 
specific groups. It is submitted that, in the absence of any such sanction, 
institutional protection of human rights through the medium of the United 
Nations remains somewhat artificial. This criticism is not affected by the fact 
that provision exists for states to be reprimanded or criticised, or that states 
seek to avoid such criticism or to rectify a situation which has been the 
occasion for such criticism. Any such action depends on the goodwill of the 
state and, as may be seen from the example of South Africa, may equally 
easily be ignored. Further, it is noticeable that the United Nations, including 
its sub-organs responsible for the supervision of human rights, are extremely 
selective as to the countries whose records they are prepared to examine with 
a critical eye. 
On the other hand, on the regional level there is far more reality in as far 
as supervision is concerned. Of the regional arrangements relating to human 
72. Supra, nolc 62 above. 
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rights, perhaps the most significant is the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 19507\ together with its supplementary Protocols. This Convention 
seeks to give real meaning to the rights set out in the Universal Declaration 
and has established a machinery to ensure their observance, and it is this 
element of the Convention which makes it so important. The parties to the 
Convention, "to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken" by 
them, have established a Commission and, for the first time, a Court of 
Human Rights. Moreover, they have even gone so far as to accept even in 
time of public emergency a restriction upon their absolute sovereign 
discretion. Not only do they have to report to the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Europe any declaration of emergency, but even when they have 
done so and seek to derogate from their obligations under the Covenant, they 
are unable to derogate from Articles 2, 3, 4( 1) and 774. Even the question of 
the validity of other derogations in emergencies may be scrutinised by the 
Commission and the Court7I. Not only are parties able to protest at breaches 
of the Convention when they affect their own nationals as is the normal rule 
of international law7'', but they possess the competence to complain of any 
breach committed regardless of the nationality of the victim, even though the 
complaining state has itself suffered no damage77. In addition, the 
Commission "may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the 
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, pro vi ded 
that the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged 
has declared that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive 
such petitions."1* In order not to disrupt established rules of international 
law even more than such a procedure inherently does, the Commission's 
competence only arises after all local remedies have been exhausted. While it 
has the prime task of seeking a friedly settlement, the Commission has 
also the right to initiate a case before the Court, and it is through this 
medium that individual rights are most usually protected, for it is only the 
Commission or a High Contracting Party that has the right to initiate 
73. 213 UNTS222. 
74. See, e.g., GREEN, "Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situations", (1978) 16 Can. 
Y.B. /nil Law 92. 
75. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, (MS) 58 l.L.R. 188. 
76. See, e.g., BKOWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 1979, 398-401 ; see, also, 
Nottebohm case, [1955] I.C.J. 4. 
77. See, e.g., Denmark, Norway. Sweeden. Netherlands v. Greece, (1968-1970), SOHN and 
BUERGENTHAL, International Protection of Human Rights, 1973, 1059-1090; France, 
Norway. Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands v. Turkey, (1985) 6 HRLJ 331. 
78. Art. 25 (italics added). 
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proceedings. The Parties to the Convention have undertaken to carry out the 
decisions of the Court and these have dealt with a variety of issues which 
would normally be regarded as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
state and as such outside the competence of international law. Because of the 
activities of both the Commission and the Court many parties have amended 
their legislation either on receipt of the Commission's recommendation or 
subsequent to a judgment by the Court. 
A similar effort to protect human rights on the regional level has been 
made by the Organisation of American States, and as a result of the American 
Convention on Human Rights of 196979 an Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights was inaugurated in late 1979. It is, however, still too early to put 
forward any estimate of the extent to which this Court will prove a true 
guarantee of human rights in Latin America or to compare its jurisprudence 
with that of the European Court. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, 198180, differs somewhat from its European and American 
precursors. Unlike them there is no Court, but only a Commission which 
"may resort to any appropriate method of investigation ; it may hear from the 
Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity or any other person 
capable of enlightening it." Moreover, the sources on which the Commission 
is directed to base its activities are interesting81 : 
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law of human and 
peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments 
on human and peoples'rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of 
the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in 
the fieds of human and peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various 
instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of 
which the parties to the present Charter are members. 
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary means to 
determine the principles of law, other general or special international 
conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the 
Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with international 
norms on human and peoples' rights, customs generally accepted as law, 
general principles of law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents 
and doctrine. 
This is the only instrument that clearly recognizes the Universal Declaration 
as a "source" of law and which enables the Commission, when established, 
and if composed of strong personalities, to develop the law concerning 
human rights in a fashion far exceeding that of either of the other two regional 
79. 9 I.L.M. 673. 
80. 21 l.L.M. 59, Art. 46 (italics added). 
81. Arts 60,61. 
L.C. GREEN Organismes internationaux et droits humains 573 
courts. But since this body is only a Commission and not ajudicial tribunal, it 
lacks the authority of a Court and its findings do not possess the same 
obligatory character. A further difference lies in the fact that the African 
Convention imposes duties upon individuals as well as granting them rights 
which states are obliged to recognize. 
In addition to the European Court of Human Rights there is also the 
Court of the European Communities established in accordance with the 
Treaty of Rome82. Although the European Community is essentially 
intended as an economic institution, in many ways it has perhaps done more 
for the institutionalised recognition and enforcement of human rights than 
any other organization. In the modern world, as was already indicated by the 
adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, economic is an important as political welfare, while the conventions 
of the International Labour Organization were intended to establish fair 
labour standards and practices. Going far beyond any of these instruments, 
the Rome Treaty seeks to establish a common standard for all residents of the 
Community members. Moreover, not only states, but individuals and 
industrial organizations also have the right of access to the Court. In 
addition, there may be an appeal from national tribunals, even of the highest 
rank, to the European Court whose decisions are final. Also, there is an 
obligation upon national courts, if they consider an issue affected by the 
Treaty to be in question, to refer that issue to the European Court and they 
are then bound to apply the judgment that is rendered as part of their own 
national jurisprudence. Since many of the issues raised relate to the right of 
movement, establishment, equality and the like, one cannot ignore the 
European Court and its contribution to the development and protection of 
human rights. 
Conclusion 
In the light of what has been said, it is submitted that despite the role 
played by the United Nations in proposing documents devoted to the 
promotion of human rights, the contribution made by that institution — 
consuming less than one per cent of the annual budget83 — and the 
International Labour Organization to the institutional development and 
protection of human rights is not as substantial as general repute would have 
it84. Moreover, there is little doubt that the Universal Declaration, which was 
82. 1957, 298 UNTS i I ; see, also, Sweel & Maxwell's European Community Treaties, 1972. 
83. The Times (London), 22 May 1986. 
84. This assessment is not affected by the fact that the latest issue of the Human Rights Lan-
Journal, 7 HRLJ 1986, 127-54, lists 59 non-regional arrangements affecting human rights. 
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no more than the lowest common multiple or highest common factor of 1948, 
would not be accepted today. The ten members of the UN had a sense of 
communality based on Judaeo-Christian principles. This is no longer true, as 
sun be seen from a statement made by the Iranian representative to the 
Human Rights Committee in 1982 : "Our people have decided to remain free, 
independent and Islamic85 and not to be fooled by the imperialist myth of 
human rights"86. This is not to deny that public reporting and public opinion, 
as well as the use that may be made of such instruments by national pressure 
groups, may well influence the conduct of a particular state and lead to 
amendments of its national law. However, real legal protection of such rights 
is more likely to result from the activities of the regional Courts of Human 
Rights. Bearing in mind the fact that the members of the European 
Community have subjected their own legal systems to the "overseeing" of the 
European Court, it may well be that it is through the instrumentality of an 
institution of this character that we will see the most significant practical 
realization of human rights through their institutionalization. 
85. Islamic concepts of punishment, including flogging, amputation and stoning are contrary to 
western concepts of torture and the rule of law. 
86. The Times, 2 June 1986. 
